Defense Perspective on Individual Employment Rights by Barnard, Thomas H. & List, Martin S.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 1 Article 10
1988
Defense Perspective on Individual Employment
Rights
Thomas H. Barnard
Duvin, Cahn & Barnard, tom.barnard@ogletreedeakins.com
Martin S. List
Duvin, Cahn & Barnard
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Thomas H. Barnard and Martin S. List, Defense Perspective on Individual Employment Rights, 67 Neb. L. Rev. (1988)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol67/iss1/10
Thomas H. Barnard* and Martin S. List**
Defense Perspective on Individual
Employment Rights
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................. 193
II. Defam ation .............................................. 194
III. Sexual Harassment ...................................... 198
IV. Bad Faith Denial of Contract: A New Tort ............. 199
V. Liability of Employees for Informing on Their Co-
W orkers ................................................. 200
VI. Drug Testing .............................................. 202
VII. AIDS .................................................... 205
VIJI. Polygraphs ............................................... 207
IX. Conclusion ............................................... 209
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a rapid evolution in the laws governing the rights
of individual employees, and it is perhaps an overstatement to label
those changes as a revolution. The changes in this area have generally
been gradual, with rights being established incrementally. However,
just as the aunt who has not seen her niece in some time is apt to
exclaim, "My, how you've grown!" upon again meeting the child, em-
ployers can now be heard to exclaim their surprise at seeing the
growth in the restrictions placed upon them in their dealings with em-
ployees. Aunts, of course, know that during the course of an absence
from their young niece, the niece was growing. They are nevertheless
surprised to see the new, enlarged version of their niece. So, too, with
employers. While they understand and are aware of the fact that the
law has been rapidly changing in the area of individual employees'
rights, they are astounded when they survey the area and digest the
magnitude of the changes. What employers view as more astonishing
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is the fact that the changes are continuing, and some of the more
sweeping changes may still lie ahead.
It is from this vantage point that management has observed the
evolution and expansion of the rights of individual employees. It is
not so much a negative response, but rather one of concern and frus-
tration. In particular, management perceives these developments as
exposing the employer to conflicting obligations and potential liabili-
ties. As an analysis of some of the recent developments in the areas of
drug testing, AIDS in the workplace, privacy, and defamation dis-
closes, the reaction of management is more than understandable.
This article will explore certain developments in the area of indi-
vidual employees' rights. Some of these developments have not yet
fully matured to "doctrines" or discrete principles of law. Rather,
some of these developments are still mere judicial hints of things
which are, perhaps, still to come. In a number of instances these hints
are gleaned from the language of courts which, while rejecting a claim,
set forth standards under which such a claim could be established.
Moreover, these developments are discussed not so much to present
an encyclopedic detailing of the current status of the law in the areas
of employment-at-will, drug testing, AIDS, polygraphs, and defama-
tion, but rather to present a management perspective on these areas,
including an analysis of the impacts these developments might have
on the traditional, non-unionized employer-employee relationship.
II. DEFAMATION
It has long been recognized that employers may be liable to em-
ployees for defamation. Employers who publish defamatory state-
ments regarding their employees or former employees are responsible
for the injuries caused by such publication. When determining the
employer's liability, courts have traditionally applied the standards
which govern defamation generally. While the standards vary some-
what between jurisdictions, a statement is defamatory, and therefore
actionable, if it is negligently published, untrue, and injures the repu-
tation or good name of the plaintiff or subjects the plaintiff to public
ridicule.
Most jurisdictions have tempered this standard by establishing a
qualified privilege for statements uttered by employers regarding
their employees. The privilege is triggered when the publication was
made in a context in which the employer had a legitimate business
reason to issue the communication to a person who shared the legiti-
mate business need for the information.1 This privilege is permitted
1. See, e.g., Zuschek v. Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa.
1977), affd, 571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1978); Benson v. Hall, 339 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1976);
Calero v. Delaware Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
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in order to foster the policy of enhancing the free flow of business
information. When the privilege applies, the plaintiff, to establish a
cause of action, must plead and prove that the employer made the ut-
terance with malice and in bad faith.2
In any event, a fundamental element of defamation is that the de-
famatory material be published to a third party. Generally, the de-
fendant's utterances directly to the plaintiff are not actionable. Aware
of this general principle, employers have traditionally felt comfortably
immune from employee libel suits when they did not communicate
information about employees to third parties. For example, employ-
ers often refrain from providing "references" - and, in particular, the
reason or reasons for the employee's termination - to inquiring pro-
spective employers or others.
This sense of security, however, may be ill-founded. Recent devel-
opments in the law indicate that employers may be liable even when
no actual publication to a third party has been made.
Relying on the doctrine of compelled self-publication, at least one
court has recently held an employer liable even in the absence of a
publication to a third party. In Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety,3 the employees/plaintiffs were terminated for gross insubordi-
nation and were informed of such by their employer. The employer
did not communicate this reason to any third parties, including any
prospective employers of the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs in-
formed their prospective employers that they were terminated-at
least according to their previous employer, Equitable-for gross insub-
ordination. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Equitable was
liable for defamation because the plaintiffs were compelled to repub-
lish the statement of the defendant when asked by their prospective
employers why they left Equitable. In addition, the court found that
Equitable had reason to believe the plaintiffs would be under a strong
compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement.
Although shocking to some, this decision is not wholly lacking in
prior judicial support. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 ar-
ticulates the doctrine of compelled self-publication. Moreover, as the
Lewis court noted, the doctrine had been applied to the employment
context in at least three prior cases.5 The courts in these cases really
did no more than adapt a recognized rule of common law to the em-
2. Each state is free to fashion its own definition of malice. The most common for-
mulation is that to prove malice a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer
made the publication with knowledge of its falsehood or in reckless disregard of
the truth.
3. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.. 1986), affg in part and rev'g in part, 361 N.W.2d 875
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
4. § 577k (1976).
5. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787,168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980);
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.W.2d 306 (1946); Grist v.
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ployment context. Accordingly, while management certainly can crit-
icize the wisdom of the application of the doctrine of compelled self-
publication, any argument that its application is without foundation
would be misguided.
Thus, in this area, the evolution was simply unnoticed by or, at the
very least, of no concern to management. If this development in
Lewis, the case of most recent note, was unexpected, perhaps it should
not have been.
The application of the doctrine of compelled self-publication to the
workplace, however predictable it should have been, places an em-
ployer in a practical and legal box from which it may be unable to
extricate itself. If an employer reveals the reason for discharging an
employee to a prospective employer, it exposes itself to claims of defa-
mation. On the other hand, if the employer refuses to communicate
such information to the prospective employer, it still remains subject
to such claims pursuant to the compelled self-publication doctrine.
This is an unenviable position.
The employer's natural reaction to this Hobson's choice is to re-
frain from openly communicating with its employees. With the cur-
rent emphasis by personnel and human resources professionals on
opening communication lines between employers and employees, this
natural reaction to limit communications in an effort to avoid liability
for defamation is seriously counter-productive. Those urging applica-
tion of the doctrine of compelled self-publication to the workplace
should seriously consider the costs to employers and employees of a
return to the hopefully bygone days when communication channels
between them were narrow - if existent at all.
The costs resulting from employers refusing to divulge information
to prospective employers will be felt elsewhere, as well. The optimal
allocation of manpower yields maximum productivity and growth. If
information to prospective employers is limited, the likelihood of
achieving this optimal allocation is correspondingly diminished. This
cost must be considered before the compelled self-publication doctrine
is freely applied in the workplace.
Additional, albeit unintended, obligations may be placed on em-
ployers by virtue of the extension of the compelled self-publication
doctrine to the workplace. Under that doctrine, an employer may be
liable when he terminates an employee, communicates the reason for
that termination to the employee, and the employee, in turn, com-
municates that reason to a prospective employer. If the employer ac-
ted in bad faith when terminating the employee, it may therefore be
liable for communicating that bad faith reason to the employee. In
Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452,168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). See also First State Bank v.
Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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essence, the doctrine establishes a requirement of good faith and fair
dealing - a requirement many states have not yet seen fit to interpose
on the employment relationship. The extension of the doctrine could,
therefore, significantly alter the law by establishing a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing where it does not presently- exist.6 Those
advocating the extension of the doctrine should be prepared to accept
as a corollary thereto the addition of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
As might be expected, for these and other reasons, the doctrine has
not been uniformly accepted. In applying Indiana law under its diver-
sity jurisdiction, the District Court of Indiana held that the doctrine
was inapplicable to the employment context in Sarratore v. Longview
Van Corp.7 The court referred to the doctrine as "appealing," but
found the "historical and judicial context" insufficient to predict that
the Supreme Court of Indiana would adopt the rationale of Lewis.8
The Colorado Court of Appeals similarly refused to extend the
doctrine to the employment context in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.9
However, the court provided little reasoning for the decision.
The future of the doctrine's application to the employment context
is, at best, uncertain. Its extension will, no doubt, meet with signifi-
cant employer resistance. In part, the resistance will find its genesis in
the employers' general attempts to limit liability. However, some of
the opposition will be based on concern over the more subtle costs at-
tendant to the inevitable narrowing of employer-employee communi-
cation channels and the restricting of the free flow of information in
the labor market generally. Critics should not be hasty to assume that
employer opposition is predominantly motivated by selfishness.
The court in Lewis viewed the relationship between the employer
and the employees as one deserving the same treatment as other busi-
ness or public relationships. The employer was to enjoy no protection
beyond that enjoyed by any other person or entity dealing with others.
Stated otherwise, the employer was to be held accountable to its em-
ployees for its acts, just as would any other culpable party.
It is perhaps this lesson which is most notably learned from Lewis
and the lesser-noted early cases. The courts, in mirroring - or, possi-
bly, foreshadowing - society are willing to strip from the employment
relationship its special status under which the employer was previ-
6. The court in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887-88
(Minn. 1986), rejected an argument that the recognition of the doctrine of com-
pelled self-publication created tort liability for wrongful discharge, noting that
such a right arguably already then existed in Minnesota. Where such a tort does
not now exist, therefore, it may be created as a natural consequence of the recog-
nition of the doctrine of compelled self-publication.
7. 666 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
8. Id. at 1264.
9. 725 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
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ously protected. If this is, in fact, a lesson of Lewis, employers should
anticipate additional applications of common law duties to the work-
place. The failure to anticipate these developments could prove to be
a serious mistake.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
It is now unquestioned that sexual harassment in the workplace is
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 It is fur-
ther recognized that the employer may be liable when the work envi-
ronment is made hostile by sexual harassment. Under Title VII, the
remedies available to the plaintiff are limited to equitable relief, lost
pay, and attorney's fees. The plaintiff cannot recover punitive or com-
pensatory damages.31 Plaintiffs, therefore, have sought other theories
under which courts might hold an employer liable for sexual harass-
ment in the workplace and consequently be able to award punitive or
compensatory damages. The most productive area has been the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. If the plaintiff proves the
commission of the tort, compensatory and punitive damages are
recoverable.
To establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
most jurisdictions require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond the bounds of decency,
and, caused severe emotional distress. Mere indignities, insults, and
embarrassments are not actionable.12
Because this is an intentional tort, the liability of the employer for
the acts of its agents must turn on dhe application of common law prin-
ciples of respondeat superior. When appropriate, therefore, the em-
ployer is liable for the acts of its agent and all the damages
proximately resulting therefrom.
In addition to liability for the acts of its agent, the employer will be
liable for any independent torts it may commit. Presumably, however,
the mere ratification of the acts of the agent does not constitute an
independent tort by the principal.
Given these rather fundamental tenets of law, the decision in Ford
v. Revlon, Inc.1 3 is an example of the expansion of general principles
when applied to the workplace. In Ford, a supervisor of the plaintiff
repeatedly harassed her by asking her out for dinner and persisting
despite her refusals, threatening to impose himself on her physically
and sexually, and actually restraining and touching her and placing
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); 42 U.S.C.
§ 200e-5(g) (1982).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965). See, e.g., Yeager v. Local Union 20,
Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 686 (1983).
13. 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987).
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his hands on her legs. The plaintiff informed the company officials
about this conduct, but they were unresponsive to her complaints and
permitted the matter to drag on for months.
The jury returned a verdict against the offending individual for as-
sault and battery, but not for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The jury did, however, find the employer liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The employer's argument that these
jury awards were inconsistent, and thus tainted, was handily rejected
by the trial and appellate courts.
What is of most interest to employers in this case is that the mere
failure to stop sexual harassment by its agents may itself constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress, even when the harassment
itself does not. With the employer already a favorite "deep pocket"
target, such an additional theory of liability is hardly a welcome addi-
tion to the expanding arsenal of the plaintiffs' legal weaponry.
IV. BAD FAITH DENIAL OF CONTRACT: A NEW TORT
A similar example of the expansion of common law doctrines when
applied to the workplace is found in Rulon-Miller v. IBM.14 While this
opinion is highly controversial for having applied the "implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing" doctrine'S to the workplace, an-
other portion of the decision may be equally, if not more, disturbing to
employers.
In RuZon-Miller, the employer sought to deny the existence of a
contract which was alleged to have been formed based upon the em-
ployer's written and verbal policies. The denial of the contract by the
employer occurred as part of its relations with the plaintiff before the
action was filed as well as part of its defense in the litigation itself.
The court held that the employer's bad faith denial of the existence
of the contract gave rise to an independently actionable claim of the
plaintiff for tort liability. This holding exemplifies one of the severest
forms of judicial activism in the area of employer-employee relations
and the most dramatic example of the stretching of common law doc-
trines to the workplace. In few, if any, instances has a claim of breach
of contract been supplemented by an independent tort for the bad
faith denial of the existence or terms of that contract.16 Yet, the Ru-
14. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
15. Id. at 248, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 529. This doctrine, borrowed from commercial law,
states that implied in every contractual relationship is the mutual obligation of
the parties to deal with each other in good faith and fairly.
16. While the rules of civil practice in many jurisdictions, as well as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, contain provisions permitting sanctions for the bad
faith filing of claims or defenses, those sanctions run against filing counsel, not
the litigant. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The "bad faith denial of contract" doctrine in
Rulon-Miller, therefore, goes well beyond these sanctions against counsel.
1988]
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Ion-Miller court created such a concept for application to the work-
place. Such a cause of action might create potential liability for
punitive and compensatory damages where the breach of the alleged
contract itself would not generally entitle the plaintiff to such
damages.
The chilling effect which would flow from a broad application of
this doctrine is frighteningly significant. Employers would, for fear of
exposing themselves to additional liability, hesitate to urge, as a de-
fense, that there was no contract with an employee. Such a hesitation
would be especially disturbing in light of the quite unsettled law in the
areas of express and implied employment contracts. The *vigorous
presentation of employers' defenses to contract claims is necessary to
permit the system to carve out clearer and more precise rules to gov-
ern this area. With employers inclined to hold back from fully
presenting their defenses to employee contract claims and the courts,
thus, lacking a balanced presentation, the law will develop without a
full airing and will likely militate more toward employee interests
than it might otherwise.
The expansive doctrines of Rulon-Miller are additional evidence
that the employer-employee relationship is no longer a privileged
child of the law. There are broader implications of these cases, as
well. The court's sanctioning of jury verdicts such as these - and the
legal reasoning behind the affirmation of such awards - signals to
management observers that existing common law doctrines will not
only be reactivated and applied to the employer-employee relation-
ship, but may actually be expanded. Therefore, not only is the em-
ployer-employee relationship no longer privileged, it is ever more
rapidly being singled out as a legal relationship requiring adjustments
through judicial intervention.
Other developments - or developments apparently about to hap-
pen - have also served or will serve to alter the traditional legal and
practical parameters of the employment relationship. One such devel-
oping area involves the potential liability of co-workers for interfer-
ence with the relationship between employer and employee.
V. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES FOR INFORMING
ON THEIR CO-WORKERS
In this highly competitive era, in which competition is global as
well as domestic,' 7 productivity and efficiency are quite important.
Employers must, therefore, seek the assistance of dedicated employ-
ees to keep the other employees in line. Employees are naturally re-
luctant to help and would be even more reluctant to if their efforts
17. For a comprehensive discussion of the impacts of global economy on United
States business, see Your Global Market, FORTUNE, Mar. 14, 1988, at 40-72.
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might expose them to liability for interfering with the employment
relationship of a co-worker.
Such a claim was brought against a co-worker by a terminated em-
ployee in Davenport v. Eplperly.18 The co-worker informed manage-
ment that the plaintiff was hunting elk while collecting benefits under
the employer's disability salary continuation program. The plaintiff
was then terminated and subsequently brought an action against the
co-worker. While the Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the grant-
ing of the co-worker's motion for summary judgment, it did so only
after reasoning that the plaintiff would have established his claim had
he demonstrated that the co-worker had acted out of improper motive
or ill will.
Employees who are aware of the potential for such liability might
refrain from voluntarily reporting violations of rules by their co-work-
ers. Furthermore, the same liability potentially attaches when the re-
porting is done pursuant to a company rule requiring such reporting.
The resulting loss of employee cooperation could lead to lower produc-
tivity and accidents or even liability of the employer to other employ-
ees and third parties.
If viewed creatively, such a cause of action can result in liability to
the employer as well. In the majority of jurisdictions which have not
adopted the "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" or "discharge
only for cause" doctrines, an employer may terminate an employee for
any reason whatsoever,19 with impunity. However, the co-worker
who reported the employee in the first instance could face liability.
Given this reasoning, if the employer was aware of the bad faith mo-
tives of the reporting co-worker and terminated the allegedly offend-
ing employee, the discharged employee could argue that the employer
also be liable in conspiracy, or through ratification of the co-worker's
actions. The anomalous result is that the employer would be liable
indirectly for that which he would not be liable directly.
Such causes of action, therefore, have the potential for substan-
tially greater impact on the employer-employee relationship than
might appear at first blush. This is another example of the multi-fac-
eted attack on the traditional employer-employee relationship under
which employer responsibility was limited, and the employer's corre-
sponding ability to efficiently compete was greater. Increased costs
and lost efficiencies are present, although they might, as a practical
matter, be incalculable. Nevertheless, these costs are real and must be
weighed against the benefits of greater "fairness" and responsibility in
the workplace.
18. 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987).
19. This would exclude, of course, civil rights laws, direct anti-retaliatory statutes, or
clear public policy restrictions.
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
VI. DRUG TESTING
While the developments in areas of traditional concern such as em-
ployee termination are dramatic, the law's treatment of issues only
recently of significance in the workplace is even more dramatic. The
use and abuse of drugs is such an area. Just as the nation has become
highly sensitized to the issue of drug abuse, employers have become
more acutely concerned vith th: direct2o and indirect costs of drug use
in, or affecting, the workplace. Additional costs can occur through lia-
bility to third parties for injuries caused by employees under the influ-
ence of drugs, whether directly2l or on the theory of negligent hiring.
Subsequently, employer reactions to the problem, such as testing and
discipline, have been counteracted by increasing limitations on em-
ployer reactions.
It is certainly reasonable for management to want to minimize the
number of employees who use drugs and to deal appropriately with
those who do. However, dealing with drug use as it affects the work-
place must, by necessity, start with detection and identification of the
employees who use drugs. That, in turn, often leads to a desire to test
for drug use. It is this testing which has emerged most visibly as an
issue.22
While federal statutory guidelines have not yet been established
for employee drug testing and the use of the test results, a number of
20. These costs, estimated at $100 billion, have been caused by lost productivity due
to absences, workers' compensation claims, on-the-job accidents, health insurance
cost increases, and theft. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG ABUSE IN
THE WORKPLACE: CONSENSUS SUMMARY, 1 (1986). The indirect costs due to mo-
rale problems and time spent by management in dealing with the problem cannot
readily be measured.
21. An interesting example of the employer's exposure is found in Henry v. Vann, 71
N.Y.2d 76, 518 N.E.2d 896, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1987), qffg, 124 App. Div. 2d 783, 508
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1986). In Henry, an employee reported to work inebriated, was
terminated, and ordered off the employer's property. On the way home, the em-
ployee collided head-on with another car, causing the death of the occupants.
The employer was held not liable for these deaths, but only because the employee
had been terminated and thus the employer bore no responsibility for the former
employee's acts. Employers no doubt shudder to think of the result had the em-
ployee merely been suspended and sent home. Implicit, perhaps, in this decision
is the theory that an employer, knowing that an employee is drunk or drugged
and thus dangerous, must restrain that employee lest the employer be responsi-
ble for injuries caused by the employee. This case, therefore, also expands com-
mon law duties owed by requiring an employer to serve as a "dry-out" center for
its employees. Such an obligation thoroughly warps the traditional employer-em-
ployee relationship and compels the employer to patronizingly act in the place of
others who traditionally provide such care and services. See also Colwell v. Oat-
man, 32 Colo. App. 171, 510 P.2d 464 (1973).
22. Federal labor law principles, such as the duty of the employer to bargain with the
union before instituting a drug testing program, are not dealt with here. Simi-
larly, constitutional and statutory issues arising from drug testing of public sector
employees are not discussed herein.
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states and localities have enacted such legislation.23 These laws deal
not only with the right to test, but also with the procedures and meth-
ods of testing. They focus on the invasion of privacy concern and re-
strict the use of the results.
Even without such legislation, just as with the communication of
any other information, employers must be careful not to disseminate
false or inaccurate reports. The failure to maintain the confidentiality
of the test results can lead to a claim for defamation. Similarly, disclo-
sure of the results to third parties, even if accurate, may expose the
employer to liability for invasion of privacy. Moreover, the question-
ing of employees during drug testing, on aspects of their priyate lives
unrelated to their employment or drug use, may constitute an invasion
of the employee's privacy.
Not unexpectedly, some employees actually welcome drug testing.
They are fearful of being injured by co-workers who are under the
influence of drugs and are unhappy with having to pick up the slack
caused by unproductive co-workers who use drugs. It is this legitimate
goal of workplace safety which often initially motivates employers to
test employees for drugs.
Moreover, drug and alcohol users themselves often wish to be de-
tected so as to be encouraged and enabled to participate in rehabilita-
tion and therapy programs.2 4  Employer sponsorship of such
programs, in conjunction with testing, can, therefore, achieve what
church and family have been unable to achieve.
The employer's efforts to use drug testing to achieve workplace
safety may, indeed, constitute more than a voluntary business deci-
sion. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requires the
employer to provide a safe workplace.25 The argument certainly can
be made that drug testing is necessarily a part of the employer's re-
sponsibility to ensure a safe workplace. Indeed, employers may seek
to take this position when defending against state and local legislative
or judicially created restrictions on drug testing, and argue that OSHA
pre-empts these state and local restrictions.
23. See, e.g., 1987 Conn. Act 551 (Reg. Sess.) (requiring three independent positive
tests before employment action can be taken; results must be kept confidential);
1987 Iowa Acts 469, (cannot require drug test as condition of employment unless
there is probable cause to believe the employee is impaired and such impairment
endangers the employee, his co-workers, or the general public); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 181.950 (West Supp. 1988) (no arbitrary testing, must have written policy;
licensed laboratories only may be used; confidentiality of results); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-6.5-1(A) to (G) (1987 Supp.) (no testing as condition of employment except
upon reasonable suspicion of impairment of ability of employee to perform his/
her job).
24. For a discussion of the phenomenon of drug users desiring, but not able to get,
treatment, see Concern Mounts Over Lengthy Wait for Drug Treatment in D.C.,
Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1988 at C1, col. 2.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1982).
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While the limits on employer drug testing and the use of the test
results26 provide employees with significant protection, those restric-
tions may result in a lack of detection which, in turn, exposes employ-
ers to liability to co-workers and third parties. Indeed, absent
restrictive legislation or clear judicial authority limiting drug testing
in a particular jurisdiction, an argument can be made that an em-
ployer's failure to test can create liability under a negligent hiring the-
ory when an employee's drug use injures a co-worker or third party.2 7
Moreover, in states which have judicially or statutorily relaxed the
traditional workers' compensation bar to tort suits against employers
for on-the-job injuries, such a failure to test could also result in addi-
tional employer liability for injuries to co-workers.28
Besides merely restricting drug testing and the use of the test re-
sults, some state laws have classified drug addiction as a handicap.2 9
As a result, employers must accommodate and not discriminate
against employees identified as addicts. Therefore, addicted employ-
ees may not be terminated simply because of their addiction.
While there may be reasonable debate as to the rationality of clas-
sifying drug addition as a handicap, there is little that can lessen the
strained morality and logic of requiring employers to employ persons
who have recently violated the laws against drug use - laws which
reflect the nation's currently heightened and more visible efforts to
stop drug abuse. Indeed, one cannot help but notice the irony of the
withdrawal of Judge Ginsburg as a nominee for the position of
Supreme Court Justice due, in large part, to his admitted casual use of
marijuana years ago,3 0 while the law requires employers to retain and
accommodate addicted employees.
Whether the war against drugs is founded on practical, social, or
moral considerations, the inconsistency in its application must be rec-
onciled before the country, including employers, can reach a consen-
sus as to drug use and the workplace. Employers cannot be expected
to face the adverse financial and other burdens of drug abuse alone.
Employers will participate along with government and the people as a
whole in eliminating drug abuse, but they will not - and, in this
26. See, e.g., supra note 23.
27. See, e.g., Colwell v. Oatman, 32 Colo. App. 171, 510 P.2d 464 (1978).
28. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem. Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 60, 433 N.E.2d 512
(1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982) (no bar where employer commits inten-
tional tort), modified by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Anderson 1987).
29. See, e.g., Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 496 N.E.2d 478
(1986). But see 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1988) (expressly excluding
drug or alcohol abuse as a handicap where the current use of drugs or alcohol
prevents the individual from performing his or her job or where his or her em-
ployment would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others).
30. In this regard, in contrast to Judge Ginsburg's dated use of marijuana, virtually
all drug testing can only detect relatively current usage.
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writer's view, should not - be the sole segment of society financially
supporting the war against drug use and abuse.
Those advocating the wholesale banning of drug testing in the
workplace, or at least severely restricting drug testing, do not properly
balance the needs of society as a whole with the rights of the individ-
ual employees. The cost is simply too great to permit the economic
and human losses resulting from drug use in the workplace in the
name of the rights of privacy and fair dealing. Employers must be
able to remain flexible in responding to the very real dangers posed by
drug use in, or affecting, the workplace. The goals must be balanced.
The statutory and judicial restrictions on drug testing and discrimi-
nation against detected drug users, and the requirement that employ-
ers accommodate-as handicapped--drug users reflect, again, a radical
departure from the traditional employer-employee relationship.
Here, too, employees are provided rights in the workplace which they
may not have in their private lives. Thus, this represents another dra-
matic example of the reconstruction of the employer-employee rela-
tionship from a privileged one, to one in which there are more
limitations than might exist in other relationships.
VII. AIDS
Perhaps no issue has had greater public visibility in recent years
than AIDS. The media, health care professionals, and the government
have all attempted to publicize their concerns regarding the spread of
the AIDS virus.31 As much emphasis has been placed on dispelling
the many misconceptions about the disease as has been placed on sen-
sitizing the public to the existence and implications of the disease.
The concern over AIDS, and the concern over its error-laden my-
thology, have reached the workplace. Employers are concerned with
liability to co-workers and third parties while, at the same time, em-
ployees often object to working with AIDS infected co-workers.
On the other hand, infected employees - or those who simply are
suspected of being infected and refuse to medically confirm or deny
that suspicion - seek to maintain what they urge to be their rights to
privacy, dignity, to be free of discrimination, and to be free from the
adverse affects of misinformed hysteria. The challenge facing the law
is to balance the interests of the employer, the infected employee, co-
workers, and third parties.
A handful of states and localities have enacted statutes designed to
31. In 1986, the Public Health Service estimated that in 1991 alone, 54,000 people will
die from the disease; and 74,000 people will contract it. Cumulatively through
1991, there will be 270,000 cases of AIDS with 179,000 deaths, the Public Health
Service further indicated. Morgan & Curran, Acquired Immunodefwiency Syn-
drome. Current and Future Trends, 101 PuB. HEALTH REP. 459, 461 (1986).
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protect AIDS victims from discrimination in the workplace. In Cali-
fornia, it is unlawful to disclose the test results, reflecting the "right to
privacy" aspect of the concern.32 Massachusetts3 3 and the City of Aus-
tin, Texas,3 4 prohibit or limit the requiring of testing for AIDS.
A number of state courts and civil rights agencies have categorized
the AIDS infection as a handicap under state laws prohibiting discrim-
ination against the handicapped.35The United States Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel has reached a similar conclusion 36 in
interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.37 These
laws require reasonable accommodation and prohibit discrimination.
AIDS victims are, therefore, assured that they may not be terminated
solely because they are infected with the AIDS virus.
Employer obligations, however, do not end with the protection of
the rights of the infected employee. The Occupational Health and
Safety Administration and the Department of Health and Human
Services have issued a Joint Advisory Notice to health care employees
stating that "[ilt is the legal responsibility of employers to provide ap-
propriate safeguards for health care workers who may be exposed to
[AIDS]" and requiring gloves as a minimum protective device for such
workers.38 There is every reason to believe that similar rulings will be
issued regarding the protection of employees from the spread of AIDS
by infected co-workers.
The OSHA-Health and Human Services Joint Advisory Notice re-
flects a wider issue. Employees are often quite concerned about being
around co-workers who are AIDS infected. Employees voice concern
over the shared use of the toilet, lunch room, water fountain, and on-
site first aid facilities with actual or suspected AIDS-infected employ-
ees.3 9 Some have even indicated a reluctance to handle tools or work
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20-.22 (West 1988).
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70F (1987).
34. Austin, Tex., Ordinance 861, 211-V (Dec. 11, 1986), Individual Empl. Rts. Man.
(BNA) 585:7 (to be codified at §§ 7-4-120 to 7-4-133).
35. Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1277, 1
Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 651, 655 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986); Department of
Fair Employment & Hous. v. Raytheon, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29 at E-1
(Feb. 13, 1987) (Cal. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n 1987), affd, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 86 at F-1 (May 4, 1988) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1988); Policy Statement Ohio
Civ. Rts. Comm'n, Treatment of Charges Alleging Discrimination Based Upon
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Comm'n (Mar. 25, 1987); Shut-
tleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget & Management Policy, Daily L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 242 at E-1 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Fla. Comm'n Human Relations 1985).
36. Application of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS,
memorandum Off. Legal Counsel (June 23, 1986), Individual Empl. Rts. Man.
(BNA) 595:3001.
37. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988).
38. Joint Advisory Notice (Dept. of Labor and Dept. of Health & Human Services) 52
Fed. Reg. 41,818 (1987).
39. A description of such hysterical and apparently medically unfounded reactions
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with machinery handled by such co-workers. While the current state
of medical knowledge indicates that such fears are totally unwar-
ranted, they nevertheless present a very serious problem for the
employer.
Employer reactions to such employee fears can range from nothing
to attempts to make employees better informed - and, thus, more
rational - to discipline. If an employer must discipline employees
who refuse to work with AIDS-infected co-workers, it may be forced
to lose valuable, productive employees and incur the costs associated
with such loss. In addition, if employees act in concert to protest
working with an AIDS-infected co-worker, their actions might be
found to constitute protected concerted activity pursuant to federal la-
bor law,40 thereby immunizing the employee from discipline.
The employer is, therefore, faced with bearing the financial and
other costs of balancing the competing interests. Perhaps no issue bet-
ter exemplifies the overall trend of making the employer a guarantor
of special treatment and the provider of rights than AIDS in the work-
place. The employer may not discriminate against, and must even ac-
commodate, the AIDS-infected employee, while at the same time
exposing itself to liability to third parties and co-workers, as well as
having to maintain the order and harmony of its fearful work force.
The costs of these responsibilities will no doubt be passed on to the
consumer. Once again, the judiciary and law makers must balance
these costs against the benefits to the individual AIDS-infected em-
ployees. A nearsighted, unthoughtful failure to consider these costs
could prove to be serious error.
VIII. POLYGRAPHS
Those involved in litigation and the practice of criminal law have
long been aware of the continuing debate over the validity and court-
room admissibility of polygraph and other bio-mechanical truth-test-
ing devices. However, this debate has now been brought into a new
arena - the workplace. Many people urge the prohibition or limita-
tion on the use of polygraph results, the requirement of a polygraph
appears in an article detailing swimmers leaving a pool which was used by an
AIDS victim and Immigration and Naturalization Service employees who de-
manded to wear gloves when they were dealing with Haitian applicants. U.S.
Confronting AIDS With Sense of Realism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,1988, at Al, col. 1.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1982). Sections 7 and 8(a)(1), respectively, of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act, provide in relevant part:
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to ... engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or protection ....
Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7.
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test as a condition of employment, or the procedures and use of
polygraphs.
A number of jurisdictions and localities currently prohibit or limit
the use of polygraphs in the workplace. Some prohibit polygraph test-
ing, while others seek to regulate or limit the procedures and use of
test results.41 Moreover, comprehensive federal legislation, just re-
cently passed, prohibits employers from requesting or requiring em-
ployees to submit to polygraph testing.42 While the law contains a
number of exceptions to these prohibitions,43 the lawful use of
polygraphs in the employment relationship in the private sector has
been virtually eliminated.44
Legislation limiting the use of polygraphs in the workplace is pre-
mised on two distinctly different concerns. First, there is widespread,
although controverted belief, that polygraphs are unreliable and, thus,
inherently unfair as a basis for employment decisions. Second, many
feel that the polygraph test invades the privacy of the employee being
tested. This belief focuses both on the mechanics of the test itself -
wires being connected to the employee - and the questions asked of
the employee.
If, indeed, these are valid bases for the restriction on the use of
polygraphs in the workplace, it necessarily follows that other em-
ployer security techniques might likewise be unlawful. For example,
41. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-
51g (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-801 to
803 (1981); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 378-26 to 29 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 44-903 (1977);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4 (Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 7166 (1988);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1982); MICH. COmp. LAws ANN.
§§ 37.201-.209 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (West Supp. 1988); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-1932 (1987); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:40A-1 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y.
LAB. LAw §§ 735-739 (McKinney Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.227 (1987); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 28-1.1 to 6.3 (1986);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 494-494e (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.4:3
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.120 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.37
(West 1988).
42. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646
(1988).
43. Most notably, section 7(d) of the Act permits employers to request employees to
take a polygraph where there is an on-going investigation of economic loss to the
employer as a result of theft, embezzlement, misappropriation or unlawful indus-
trial expionage or sabatoge. However, even when such a request is made, employ-
ees may not be discharged or otherwise adversely affected in their employment if
they refuse to take the polygraph or terminate the polygraph examination at any
point. Id § 7(d), 102 Stat. at 649.
44. Section 10 of Public Law 100-347 expressly provides that state and local laws, as
well as collective bargaining agreements, which are more restrictive of the use of
polygraphs are to remain enforceable and are not preempted or otherwise af-
fected by the Act. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Commit-
tee noted that such state or local laws or collective bargaining agreements could
preempt the limited exceptions provided in the Act. Id § 10, 102 Stat. at 653.
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tough interrogation by professionals might be deemed unlawful. The
results of such interrogation can be unreliable and constitute an inva-
sion of the employee's privacy. Electronic surveillance of employees
in the workplace may be similarly unlawful. Therefore, if the logic of
the antipolygraph arguments is extended, the results might severely
emasculate employer security efforts; with the inevitable pass through
to consumers of the resulting increased costs.
IX. CONCLUSION
One need not resolve the myriad of issues which arise in each of
the areas discussed herein in order to focus on the overall implications
of the trend. Regardless of whether polygraph tests are reliable, for
example, and regardless of whether the administration of drug tests
invades the privacy of the employee, every employee has the choice to
refuse these tests, although risking adverse employment action in the
course of that refusal. As such, it is clear that underlying the trends
discussed is the much more general premise that the employer now is
to serve as a guarantor of rights generally thought to be afforded
solely by governments. The workplace is, therefore, being viewed as a
place where society's general values of fairness are to be adhered to
despite the voluntary nature of employer-employee relationships
which are formed, in theory, on the basis of the freely self-adjusting
supply and demand of labor.
If concerns for fundamental fairness lie behind the dramatic
trends, such trends are likely to continue. If, however, these develop-
ments reflect the view that employers traditionally have greater
power than their workers, and that such power needs readjustment,
one may safely assume that these trends will periodically show change
as the balance of economic power between employers and employees
shifts.
Regardless of the motivations behind these trends, we need to re-
trench and evaluate, as a nation, what shape we want the employer-
employee relationship to ultimately take. Whenever the law inter-
venes to skew the free flow of the marketplace, there is a cost attached
to that intervention. As a society, we may indeed be willing to pay
that cost. However, unlike the prohibition of baseless, individious dis-
crimination, which prohibition may result in no costs to employers -
and, indeed, may even result in direct economic benefits due to the
more optimal allocation of manpower that flows from a merit-based
employment system - the trends discussed herein result in direct eco-
nomic costs to employers and, therefore, to the public. Those who will
make the decisions cannot do so solely out of instinctive reactions.
Moreover, those who oppose or seek to limit the judicial and legisla-
tive efforts to change the role of the employer in the workplace should
not be branded as uncaring And selfish.
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The fact that many of these workplace concerns are being handled
on a local level only serves to heighten the confusion and the costs.
Through piecemeal, state-by-state developments, substantive inconsis-
tencies have been commonplace. Many of the judicial and legislative
efforts have been far too short-sighted. Employers are asked to shoul-
der the burden of competing interests and are often placed in unenvi-
able, no-win situations. At the same time employer liability to co-
workers and third parties is increasingly broadened, the employer's
ability to control its work force so as to limit its exposure to those
liabilities is being restricted.
If reforms are necessary in the law of the workplace, those reforms
should be legislative, not judicial, and national in scope. Employers
operating on a multistate basis, with interstate impact, cannot reason-
ably be expected to be accountable under fifty or more diverse sets of
rules, each changing so quickly as to be nearly unmonitorable. The
result can be chaos, with neither employee rights nor the rights of co-
workers or third parties being well served.
The management perspective, if rationally composed, is simply
this: Newly established rights have costs, and these costs should not
be ignored. Progress in the area of employee rights is inevitable and
desirable. If pushed too far, however, the American workplace will be
rich with employee rights and poor economically. This is the
challenge.
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